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|title=Review of P. Coffey, ''The science of logic'' | |title=Review of P. Coffey, ''The science of logic'' | ||
|content= In 1913, Wittgenstein published a very short review of philosopher and mathematician Peter Coffey’s ''The science of logic'' in ''The Cambridge Review'' (vol. 34, no. 853, 6 Mar. 1913, p. 351). In an openly ironic tone, Wittgenstein argues against the antiquated views of the author and the inaccuracies of the logical notions he expresses, some of which – such as the subject-predicate form of the proposition, the relationship between thought and reality, and the logical-semantic function of the verb “to be” – will have an important development in Wittgenstein’s own works from the 1910s. | |content= In 1913, Wittgenstein published a very short review of philosopher and mathematician Peter Coffey’s ''The science of logic'' in ''The Cambridge Review'' (vol. 34, no. 853, 6 Mar. 1913, p. 351) as part of his academic duties as a bachelor student. In an openly ironic tone, Wittgenstein argues against the antiquated views of the author and the inaccuracies of the logical notions he expresses, some of which – such as the subject-predicate form of the proposition, the relationship between thought and reality, and the logical-semantic function of the verb “to be” – will have an important development in Wittgenstein’s own works from the 1910s. | ||
Go to [[Review of P. Coffey, “The Science of Logic”|Review of P. Coffey, ''The science of logic'']]}} | Go to [[Review of P. Coffey, “The Science of Logic”|Review of P. Coffey, ''The science of logic'']]}} | ||
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|content=According to Rush Rhees, in 1929 Wittgenstein’s disciple Maurice O’Connor Drury (1907-1976) procured and read to his mentor passages from the English anthropologist Sir James George Frazer’s (1854-1941) ''The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion'' (in the 12-volume edition of 1906-1915). A series of remarks in German were drawn by Wittgenstein from the reading in 1931; they were later revised and expanded, after 1936 and probably after 1948. Rhees edited the notes on Frazer for publication and they appeared in 1967 in the German journal ''Synthese''. The published text brings together extracts of Wittgenstein’s ''Nachlass'' Ms-110, Ts-211 and Ms-143. | |content=According to Rush Rhees, in 1929 Wittgenstein’s disciple Maurice O’Connor Drury (1907-1976) procured and read to his mentor passages from the English anthropologist Sir James George Frazer’s (1854-1941) ''The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion'' (in the 12-volume edition of 1906-1915). A series of remarks in German were drawn by Wittgenstein from the reading in 1931; they were later revised and expanded, after 1936 and probably after 1948. Rhees edited the notes on Frazer for publication and they appeared in 1967 in the German journal ''Synthese''. The published text brings together extracts of Wittgenstein’s ''Nachlass'' Ms-110, Ts-211 and Ms-143. | ||
In his ''Remarks on Frazer’s “The Golden Bough”'', Wittgenstein openly opposes the tendency in anthropology to rationalize apparently irrational practices and behaviours belonging to the sphere of magic and the sacred in non-western societies. To this type of reduction Wittgenstein opposes an account based on the cultural-relative validity of linguistic practices, significantly accusing Frazer of being “far more savage than most of his savages, for these savages will not be as far removed from an understanding of spiritual matters as an Englishman of the twentieth century”. The understanding of anthropological phenomena must therefore be relative to the context in which they take place, and in which, for example, a sacrificial or ritual practice is not traceable to the modern scientific explanation, because it arises in an entirely different form of life. Such forms of life | In his ''Remarks on Frazer’s “The Golden Bough”'', Wittgenstein openly opposes the tendency in anthropology to rationalize apparently irrational practices and behaviours belonging to the sphere of magic and the sacred in non-western societies. To this type of reduction Wittgenstein opposes an account based on the cultural-relative validity of linguistic practices, significantly accusing Frazer of being “far more savage than most of his savages, for these savages will not be as far removed from an understanding of spiritual matters as an Englishman of the twentieth century”. The understanding of anthropological phenomena, Wittgenstein argues, must therefore be relative to the context in which they take place, and in which, for example, a sacrificial or ritual practice is not traceable to the modern scientific explanation, because it arises in an entirely different form of life. Such forms of life are manifest in the language games in which they are embodied, so that, quoting another famous statement from the book, “a whole mythology is deposited in our language”. | ||
In bringing an explicit content to contemporary anthropology, | In bringing an explicit content to contemporary anthropology, Wittgenstein's philosophy thus takes on here some epistemological questions, which will be called up on several occasions in the ''Philosophical Investigations'' and in ''On Certainty''. | ||
Go to "[[Bemerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough”|Bemerkungen über Frazers ''The Golden Bough'']]"}} | Go to "[[Bemerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough”|Bemerkungen über Frazers ''The Golden Bough'']]"}} | ||
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