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Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway: Difference between revisions
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Therefore a {{small caps|theory}} ''of types'' is impossible. It tries to say something about the types, when you can only talk about the symbols. But ''what'' you say about the symbols is not that this symbol has that type, which would be nonsense for [the] same reason: but you say simply: ''This'' is the symbol, to prevent a misunderstanding. E.g., in "aRb", "R" is ''not'' a symbol, but ''that'' "R" is between one name and another symbolizes. Here we have ''not'' said: this symbol is not of this type but of that, but only: ''This'' symbolizes and not that. This seems again to make the same mistake, because "symbolizes" is "typically ambiguous". The true analysis is: "R" is no proper name, and, that "R" stands between "a" and "b" expresses a ''relation''. Here are two propositions ''of different type'' connected by "and". | Therefore a {{small caps|theory}} ''of types'' is impossible. It tries to say something about the types, when you can only talk about the symbols. But ''what'' you say about the symbols is not that this symbol has that type, which would be nonsense for [the] same reason: but you say simply: ''This'' is the symbol, to prevent a misunderstanding. E.g., in "aRb", "R" is ''not'' a symbol, but ''that'' "R" is between one name and another symbolizes. Here we have ''not'' said: this symbol is not of this type but of that, but only: ''This'' symbolizes and not that. This seems again to make the same mistake, because "symbolizes" is "typically ambiguous". The true analysis is: "R" is no proper name, and, that "R" stands between "a" and "b" expresses a ''relation''. Here are two propositions ''of different type'' connected by "and". | ||
It is ''obvious'' that, e.g., with a subject-predicate proposition, ''if'' it has any sense at all, you ''see'' the form, so soon as you ''understand'' the proposition, in spite of not knowing whether it is true or false. Even if there ''were'' propositions of [the] form " | It is ''obvious'' that, e.g., with a subject-predicate proposition, ''if'' it has any sense at all, you ''see'' the form, so soon as you ''understand'' the proposition, in spite of not knowing whether it is true or false. Even if there ''were'' propositions of [the] form "M is a thing" they would be superfluous (tautologous) because what this tries to say is something which is already ''seen'' when you see "M". | ||
In the above expression "aRb", we were talking only of this particular "R", whereas what we want to do is to talk of all similar symbols. We have to say: in ''any'' symbol of this form what corresponds to "R" is not a proper name, and the fact that ["R" stands between "a" and "b"] expresses a relation. This is what is sought to be expressed by the nonsensical assertion: Symbols like this are of a certain type. This you can't say, because in order to say it you must first know what the symbol is: and in knowing this you ''see'' [the] type and therefore also [the] type of [what is] symbolized. I.e. in knowing ''what'' symbolizes, you know all that is to be known; you can't ''say'' anything ''about'' the symbol. | In the above expression "aRb", we were talking only of this particular "R", whereas what we want to do is to talk of all similar symbols. We have to say: in ''any'' symbol of this form what corresponds to "R" is not a proper name, and the fact that ["R" stands between "a" and "b"] expresses a relation. This is what is sought to be expressed by the nonsensical assertion: Symbols like this are of a certain type. This you can't say, because in order to say it you must first know what the symbol is: and in knowing this you ''see'' [the] type and therefore also [the] type of [what is] symbolized. I.e. in knowing ''what'' symbolizes, you know all that is to be known; you can't ''say'' anything ''about'' the symbol. | ||