Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English): Difference between revisions

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4.0621 That, however, the signs “''p''” and “~''p''” can say the same thing is important, for it shows that the sign “''~''” corresponds to nothing in reality.
4.0621 That, however, the signs “''p''” and “~''p''” can say the same thing is important, for it shows that the sign “''~''” corresponds to nothing in reality.


That negation occurs in a proposition, is no characteristic of its sense (''~ ~p=p'').
That negation occurs in a proposition, is no characteristic of its sense (''~~p=p'').


The propositions “''p''” and “''~p''” have opposite senses, but to them corresponds one and the same reality.
The propositions “''p''” and “''~p''” have opposite senses, but to them corresponds one and the same reality.
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In a similar sense I speak of the successive application of ''several'' operations to a number of propositions.
In a similar sense I speak of the successive application of ''several'' operations to a number of propositions.


5.2522 The general term of the formal series ''a, O', a, O' O' a,'' ... I write thus : "[''a, x, O' x'']". This expression in brackets is a variable. The first term of the expression is the beginning of the formal series, the second the form of an arbitrary term ''x'' of the series, and the third the form of that term of the series which immediately follows ''x''.
5.2522 The general term of the formal series ''a, O', a, O' O' a,'' ... I write thus: "[''a, x, O' x'']". This expression in brackets is a variable. The first term of the expression is the beginning of the formal series, the second the form of an arbitrary term ''x'' of the series, and the third the form of that term of the series which immediately follows ''x''.


5.2523 The concept of the successive application of an operation is equivalent to the concept "and so on".
5.2523 The concept of the successive application of an operation is equivalent to the concept "and so on".
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5.253 One operation can reverse the effect of another. Operations can cancel one another.
5.253 One operation can reverse the effect of another. Operations can cancel one another.


5.254 Operations can vanish (''e.g.'' denial in "~ ~ ''p''". ~ ~ ''p = p'').
5.254 Operations can vanish (''e.g.'' denial in "~~''p''", ~~''p'' = ''p'').


5.3 All propositions are results of truth-operations on the elementary propositions.
5.3 All propositions are results of truth-operations on the elementary propositions.
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And it is obvious that the "⊃" which we define by means of "~" and "∨" is identical with that by which we define "∨" with the help of "~", and that this "∨" is the same as the first, and so on.
And it is obvious that the "⊃" which we define by means of "~" and "∨" is identical with that by which we define "∨" with the help of "~", and that this "∨" is the same as the first, and so on.


5.43 That from a fact ''p'' an infinite number of ''others'' should follow, namely ~ ~''p'', ~ ~ ~ ~''p'' etc., is indeed hardly to be believed, and it is no less wonderful that the infinite number of propositions of logic (of mathematics) should follow from half a dozen "primitive propositions".
5.43 That from a fact ''p'' an infinite number of ''others'' should follow, namely ~~''p'', <nowiki>~~~~</nowiki>''p'' etc., is indeed hardly to be believed, and it is no less wonderful that the infinite number of propositions of logic (of mathematics) should follow from half a dozen "primitive propositions".


But all propositions of logic say the same thing. That is, nothing.
But all propositions of logic say the same thing. That is, nothing.
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If ''e.g.'' an affirmation can be produced by repeated denial, is the denial — in any sense — contained in the affirmation?
If ''e.g.'' an affirmation can be produced by repeated denial, is the denial — in any sense — contained in the affirmation?


Does "''~ ~p''" deny ~''p'', or does it affirm ''p''; or both?
Does "~~''p''" deny ~''p'', or does it affirm ''p''; or both?


The proposition "''~ ~p''" does not treat of denial as an object, but the possibility of denial is already prejudged in affirmation.
The proposition "''~~p''" does not treat of denial as an object, but the possibility of denial is already prejudged in affirmation.


And if there was an object called "~", then "~ ~''p''" would have to say something other than "''p''". For the one proposition would then treat of ~ , the other would not.
And if there was an object called "~", then "~~''p''" would have to say something other than "''p''". For the one proposition would then treat of ~ , the other would not.


5.441 This disappearance of the apparent logical constants also occurs if "~(∃''x'') . ~''fx''" says the same as "(''x'') . ''fx''", or "(∃''x'') . ''fx'' . ''x'' = ''a''" the same as "''fa''".
5.441 This disappearance of the apparent logical constants also occurs if "~(∃''x'') . ~''fx''" says the same as "(''x'') . ''fx''", or "(∃''x'') . ''fx'' . ''x'' = ''a''" the same as "''fa''".
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5.452 The introduction of a new expedient in the symbolism of logic must always be an event full of consequences. No new symbol may be introduced in logic in brackets or in the margin — with, so to speak, an entirely innocent face. (Thus in the "Principia Mathematica" of Russell and Whitehead there occur definitions and primitive propositions in words. Why suddenly words here? This would need a justification. There was none, and can be none for the process is actually not allowed.)
5.452 The introduction of a new expedient in the symbolism of logic must always be an event full of consequences. No new symbol may be introduced in logic in brackets or in the margin — with, so to speak, an entirely innocent face. (Thus in the "Principia Mathematica" of Russell and Whitehead there occur definitions and primitive propositions in words. Why suddenly words here? This would need a justification. There was none, and can be none for the process is actually not allowed.)


But if the introduction of a new expedient has proved necessary in one place, we must immediately ask : Where is this expedient ''always'' to be used? Its position in logic must be made clear.
But if the introduction of a new expedient has proved necessary in one place, we must immediately ask: Where is this expedient ''always'' to be used? Its position in logic must be made clear.


5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification.
5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification.
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Where there is composition, there is argument and function, and where these are, all logical constants already are.
Where there is composition, there is argument and function, and where these are, all logical constants already are.


One could say : the one logical constant is that which ''all'' propositions, according to their nature, have in common with one another.
One could say: the one logical constant is that which ''all'' propositions, according to their nature, have in common with one another.


That however is the general form of proposition.
That however is the general form of proposition.
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Signs which serve ''one'' purpose are logically equivalent, signs which serve ''no'' purpose are logically meaningless.
Signs which serve ''one'' purpose are logically equivalent, signs which serve ''no'' purpose are logically meaningless.


5.4733 Frege says: Every legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense; and I say : Every possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and if it has no sense this can only be because we have given no ''meaning'' to some of its constituent parts.
5.4733 Frege says: Every legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense; and I say: Every possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and if it has no sense this can only be because we have given no ''meaning'' to some of its constituent parts.


(Even if we believe that we have done so.)
(Even if we believe that we have done so.)
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5.531 I write therefore not "f(''a'', ''b'') . ''a'' = ''b''" but "''f'' (''a'', ''a'')" (or "''f'' (''b'', ''b'')"). And not "''f'' (''a'', ''b'') . ~''a'' = b" but "''f'' (''a'', ''b'')"
5.531 I write therefore not "f(''a'', ''b'') . ''a'' = ''b''" but "''f'' (''a'', ''a'')" (or "''f'' (''b'', ''b'')"). And not "''f'' (''a'', ''b'') . ~''a'' = b" but "''f'' (''a'', ''b'')"


5.532 And analogously : not "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ''x'' = ''y''", but "(∃''x'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''x'')"; and not "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ~''x'' = ''y''" but "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'')".
5.532 And analogously: not "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ''x'' = ''y''", but "(∃''x'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''x'')"; and not "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ~''x'' = ''y''" but "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'')".


(Therefore instead of Russell's "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'')": "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ∨ . (∃''x'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''x'')".)
(Therefore instead of Russell's "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'')": "(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''y'') . ∨ . (∃''x'') . ''f'' (''x'', ''x'')".)
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5.5321 Instead of "(''x'') : ''f'' ''x'' ⊃ ''x'' = ''a''" we therefore write ''e.g.'' "(∃''x'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ⊃ . ''f'' ''a'' : ~(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ''f'' ''y''".
5.5321 Instead of "(''x'') : ''f'' ''x'' ⊃ ''x'' = ''a''" we therefore write ''e.g.'' "(∃''x'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ⊃ . ''f'' ''a'' : ~(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ''f'' ''y''".


And the proposition "''only'' one ''x'' satisfies ''f''()" reads : "(∃''x'') . ''f'' ''x'' : ~(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ''f'' ''y''".
And the proposition "''only'' one ''x'' satisfies ''f''()" reads: "(∃''x'') . ''f'' ''x'' : ~(∃ ''x'', ''y'') . ''f'' ''x'' . ''f'' ''y''".


5.533 The identity sign is therefore not an essential constituent of logical notation.
5.533 The identity sign is therefore not an essential constituent of logical notation.


5.534 And we see that apparent propositions like : "''a'' = ''a''", "''a'' = ''b'' . ''b'' = ''c'' . ⊃ ''a'' = ''c''", "(''x'') . ''x'' = ''x''", "(∃''x'') . ''x'' = ''a''", etc. cannot be written in a correct logical notation at all.
5.534 And we see that apparent propositions like: "''a'' = ''a''", "''a'' = ''b'' . ''b'' = ''c'' . ⊃ ''a'' = ''c''", "(''x'') . ''x'' = ''x''", "(∃''x'') . ''x'' = ''a''", etc. cannot be written in a correct logical notation at all.


5.535 So all problems disappear which are connected with such pseudo-propositions.
5.535 So all problems disappear which are connected with such pseudo-propositions.
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It is before the How, not before the What.
It is before the How, not before the What.


5.5521 And if this were not the case, how could we apply logic? We could say: if there were a logic, even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic, since there is a world ?
5.5521 And if this were not the case, how could we apply logic? We could say: if there were a logic, even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic, since there is a world?


5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (individuals). But between what numbers? And how should this be decided — by experience ?
5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (individuals). But between what numbers? And how should this be decided — by experience?


(There is no pre-eminent number.)
(There is no pre-eminent number.)
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5.554 The enumeration of any special forms would be entirely arbitrary.
5.554 The enumeration of any special forms would be entirely arbitrary.


5.5541 How could we decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to symbolize with a sign of a 27-termed relation ?
5.5541 How could we decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to symbolize with a sign of a 27-termed relation?


5.5542 May we then ask this at all? Can we set out a sign form and not know whether anything can correspond to it?
5.5542 May we then ask this at all? Can we set out a sign form and not know whether anything can correspond to it?
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<p style="text-align:center;">„<math>[ \Omega^{0 \prime} x, \Omega^{\nu \prime} x, \Omega^{\nu + 1 \prime} x ]</math>“.</p>
<p style="text-align:center;">„<math>[ \Omega^{0 \prime} x, \Omega^{\nu \prime} x, \Omega^{\nu + 1 \prime} x ]</math>“.</p>


And I define :
And I define:


:<math>0 + 1 = 1 \text{ Def.}</math>
:<math>0 + 1 = 1 \text{ Def.}</math>
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And the concept of equality of numbers is the general form of all special equalities of numbers.
And the concept of equality of numbers is the general form of all special equalities of numbers.


6.03 The general form of the cardinal number is : [0, ''ξ'', ''ξ'' + 1].
6.03 The general form of the cardinal number is: [0, ''ξ'', ''ξ'' + 1].


6.031 The theory of classes is altogether superfluous in mathematics.
6.031 The theory of classes is altogether superfluous in mathematics.
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[[File:TLP 6.1203c-en.png|250px|center|link=]]
[[File:TLP 6.1203c-en.png|250px|center|link=]]


the form "''ξ . η''" thus : —
the form "''ξ . η''" thus: —


[[File:TLP 6.1203d-en.png|300px|center|link=]]
[[File:TLP 6.1203d-en.png|300px|center|link=]]
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6.1265 Logic can always be conceived to be such that every proposition is its own proof.
6.1265 Logic can always be conceived to be such that every proposition is its own proof.


6.127 All propositions of logic are of equal rank ; there are not some which are essentially primitive and others deduced from these.
6.127 All propositions of logic are of equal rank; there are not some which are essentially primitive and others deduced from these.


Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology.
Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology.
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6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: "There are natural laws".
6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: "There are natural laws".


But that can clearly not be said : it shows itself.
But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself.


6.361 In the terminology of Hertz we might say: Only ''uniform'' connexions are ''thinkable''.
6.361 In the terminology of Hertz we might say: Only ''uniform'' connexions are ''thinkable''.
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6.3751 For two colours, ''e.g.'' to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour.
6.3751 For two colours, ''e.g.'' to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour.


Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. Somewhat as follows : That a particle cannot at the same time have two velocities, ''i.e.'' that at the same time it cannot be in two places, ''i.e.'' that particles in different places at the same time cannot be identical.
Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. Somewhat as follows: That a particle cannot at the same time have two velocities, ''i.e.'' that at the same time it cannot be in two places, ''i.e.'' that particles in different places at the same time cannot be identical.


(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction.)
(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction.)